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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION CASE
LAW
E. A. SIMPSON, JR.*
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
T he most startling development in aviation case-law during
1982 was the United States Court of Appeal for the Sec-
ond Circuit's pronouncement in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.1 that the Warsaw Convention's2 limits on
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690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982). The suit was brought by the Franklin Mint Corpora-
tion and others to recover damages for the loss or destruction of certain cargo the
plaintiffs had entrusted to the defendant, Trans World Airlines, to transport from the
United States to England. Because the plaintiffs had failed to specifically declare the
value of the cargo, the airline sought to limit its liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. See infra note 2.
' "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air," opened for signature October 1949, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The relevant portions of
the Convention in Article 22 state that:
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liabil-
ity of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at deliv-
ery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that
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liability are prospectively unenforceable in United States
courts.8 . The problem with enforcing the liability limits, ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, is that the Convention uses
gold as the unit of conversion to measure a plaintiff's recov-
ery.4 According to the court, however, events subsequent' to
the Convention's drafting prompted those nations parties to
the agreement to abandon gold as a currency base and, thus,
to undermine the Convention's unit of conversion. For exam-
ple, in 1978 the United States repealed the Par Value Modifi-
cation Act and thus repealed the official price of gold in the
United States. While other parties to the Warsaw Convention
adopted alternative measures of conversion by signing a Pro-
tocol to the Convention,' the United States has not yet ac-
ceded officially to the Protocol. Thus, the court in Franklin
Mint observed that, at present, "there is no United States leg-
islation specifying a unit to be used by United States courts"
case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to
the consignor at delivery.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 65 /2 milligrams of gold at the standard of
fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted
into any national currency in round figures.
49 Stat. at 3019.
' 690 F.2d at 311-12. The court gave its holding prospective effect only, reasoning
that the parties before it had "assumed" that the court had the power to select a new
unit of conversion and, thus, its "resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. (quot-
ing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)).
1 690 F.2d at 305. The court explained that the parties to the Convention selected
gold as the unit of conversion because at the time of the Convention gold "served an
official monetary function and its price was set by law." Id. Thus, the court observed
that the Convention employed the gold measure because the parties believed it would
ensure judgments of "uniform value" and would provide an easily calculable liability
limit. Id.
* After the United States had ratified the Convention, the depletion of its gold
reserves prompted the Congress to repeal the official price of gold, and prompted the
International Monetary Fund to substitute an alternative measure of account for the
previous gold measure. Id. at 308.
* Id. The court explained that the Warsaw conferees agreed upon a Protocol to the
Convention that substituted for the gold unit of conversion the measure endorsed by
the International Monetary Fund, the Special Drawing Right (SDR). It further noted
that the Protocol was presented to the United States Senate in January 1977, but was
not approved. Id.
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to calculate a plaintiff's recovery under the Convention.7
While the plaintiff offered various alternative measures8
that had each received support from other parties to the Con-
vention, the court refused to select among the alternatives. It
reasoned that none of the alternative measures of conversion
had Congressional support and that the decision regarding the
appropriate unit of conversion was not within the province of
the courts.' In addition, the Second Circuit expressed con-
cern that the international community had not agreed upon
an official unit of conversion to replace the gold measure
under the Convention.10 The court thus stated that by re-
questing that the court select an alternative unit of conver-
sion, the parties required the court to make a judgment re-
garding the United States' policy interests as a party to the
Warsaw Convention." The Second Circuit concluded that the
decision was a matter for Congress and was a political ques-
tion, unfit for judicial resolution."
While Franklin Mint dealt specifically with the liability
limit applicable to loss of or damage to cargo or baggage, the
court's reasoning unquestionably would apply to actions
7 Id. at 309.
a The parties suggested four alternative measures: (1) the last official price of gold
in the United States, (2) the free market price of gold, (3) the SDR, the unit em-
ployed by the International Monetary Fund, and (4) the exchange value of the
French franc. The court rejected each of the measures, stating:
[t]he last official price of gold is a price which has been explicitly re-
pealed by the Congress . . . . It thus lacks any status in law or rela-
tionship to contemporary currency values. The free market price of
gold is the highly volatile price of a commodity determined in part by
forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency values. SDR's are a
creature of the [International Monetary Fund], modified at will by
that body and having no basis in the Convention. The French franc is
simply one domestic currency, subject to change by the unilateral act




:I Id. at 311.
2 Id. The court noted that the lack of an international standard of conversion pos-
sibly had resulted in the abrogation of the Convention. It found that the decision as
to whether the treaty was abrogated, however, was in the province of the legislative
and executive branches of the government and was not a matter for "judicial cogni-
zance." Id. at 311 n.26 (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887)).
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under the Convention for personal injury.13 The court's rea-
soning is equally applicable to actions for personal injuries be-
cause the Convention employs gold as the unit of conversion
in both suits for personal injury and suits for property dam-
age." In this author's opinion, the decision in Franklin Mint
poses the potential problem that plaintiffs may successfully
hold air carriers liable for damages without presenting proof
of the carrier's fault but without the concomitant limitation
on the carrier's liability that the Warsaw Convention
guarantees.
Several cases during 1981-82 addressed the adequacy of an
airline's notice to passengers of its intent to avail itself of the
liability limitations contained in the Warsaw Convention, as
modified by the Montreal Agreement (Warsaw/Montreal). 5
For example, in Moner v. Port Authority of New York,16 a
case of first impression, the plaintiff sought to avoid the limi-
tation on the defendant-airline's liability because the ticket
that the airline issued to her stated that the Warsaw Conven-
tion "may" be applicable.1 7 The plaintiff argued that under
Is Article 22, paragraph one of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) In the transporation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the
equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000
francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id.
14 See supra note 2.
1s 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1976). The relevant portions of Warsaw/Montreal state:
1. For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a pas-
senger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relat-
ing to liability established by this Convention.
Id.
1* 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,081 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
1, Id. at 18,082. The "notice" on the plaintiff's ticket stated that "'if the passen-
ger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the
country of departure the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the Convention
governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury
and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage'." Id. at 18,081. The ticket further
contained a provision referring the passenger to another notice provision that con-
tained a more detailed explanation of the carrier's liability under Warsaw/Montreal.
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Warsaw/Montreal, the ticket should have stated affirmatively
that the Convention "is" applicable."8 The defendant-airline,
on the other hand, defended on the ground that the wording
of the notice on the ticket conformed almost precisely to the
statement published by the Civil Aeronautics Board in a regu-
lation enacted pursuant to the Convention, which also used
the word "may."19 The court, rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment, stated that the airline's "use of the word 'may,' as op-
posed to 'is,' does not, as a matter of law, deprive air passen-
gers of a reasonable opportunity to take further precautions to
ascertain the applicability and extent of the limitations. '2 0
The court further rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
average layman should not be expected to determine whether
Warsaw/Montreal would apply to a given flight.21 It reasoned
that the "essential import" of the language of the notice on
the ticket "should be comprehensible to the average layman"
and at least should give him "'fair warning of the existence of
limitations on the [air] carrier's liability.' ,22
Subsequently, the same court in O'Rourke v. Eastern Air
Lines2 s upheld a notice provision despite the plaintiff's claim
that the notice, while generally valid, was inadequate with re-
spect to the particular person involved. 4 The notice contained
the statement required by the Civil Aeronautics Board Regu-
lations and by the Montreal Agreement and was printed in
English on the ticket.2 The plaintiffs, suing for wrongful
death, claimed that the notice was inadequate, however, with
" Id. at 18,082.
19 Id. 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1981) requires that airlines desiring to avail themselves
of the limitations on liability contained in the Convention furnish to passengers a
statement that "passengers embarking upon a journey involving an ultimate destina-
tion or stop in a country other than the country of departure are advised that the
provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to their
entire journey .... ." Id.
20 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,083.
Id. at 18,082.
Id. at 18,083.
16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,367 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 18,370.
, Id. The court noted that both the Montreal Agreement and the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board Regulations (CAB) are silent as to which language the notice should con-
tain. Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1981).
19831
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respect to the decedent because he spoke and understood only
Greek.2 6 Noting that the flight in question originated in the
United States, the court held the notice sufficient as a matter
of law, reasoning that "if the notice is in the language of the
place of contract, it must surely be sufficient. '2 7
The court in In Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland2 1
likewise addressed the sufficiency of the notice printed on an
airline ticket. The plaintiffs, suing for wrongful death, claimed
that the notice provision on the tickets issued by the Polish
Airline, Polskie Linie Lotnicze, was deficient because the type
size was too small.2 While the Montreal Agreement" requires
the notice to be printed in ten-point type, the defendant-air-
line had printed the notice in 8.5 type. 1
The court found that the defendant's use of the smaller
type-size was a breach of its duties under the Montreal Agree-
ment, 2 which the court observed "deals explicitly with the
size of the type required for adequate notice." Moreover, the
court reasoned that the parties to the Montreal Agreement
had intended to require strict compliance with the type-size
requirement. The court therefore rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that it had "substantially" performed its responSibili-
ties under the agreement, 3 stating that it "doubted whether
the doctrine of substantial performance ha[d] any application
at all to a contract such as [the Montreal Agreement]."3
Finally, the court held that the defendant's breach of the
Montreal Agreement resulted in its forfeiture of its defenses
under the Warsaw Convention, including forfeiture of the air-
28 Id. at 18,370.
" Id. The court further reasoned that practical considerations dictated against re-
quiring "every ticket counter at every airport in the world to keep tickets printed
with notice in all of the world's languages." Id.
2 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
" Id. at 835.
'o See 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1981).
" 535 F. Supp. at 835.
Id. at 836.
" Id. at 837-38. The court distinguished the Montreal Agreement from the custom-
ary contract for carriage, to which the doctrine of substantial permforance would ap-
ply, stating that application of the doctrine to the terms of the Agreement would
"severely undercut" and possibly "frustrate" entirely the Agreement's purposes. Id.
" Id. at 838.
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line's limited liability.85 The court reasoned that the "Mon-
treal Agreement was clearly intended to operate within the
framework and incorporate all the relevant provisions of the
Convention." ' 6 Accordingly, it held that the defendant air-
line's breach of the Agreement's provision respecting notice
had the same effect as non-delivery of a conforming ticket
under the Warsaw Convention.37 Therefore, since non-delivery
of a ticket under Warsaw would have precluded the airline
from relying on the defenses available under the Convention,
the court refused to allow the defendant to assert the defenses
that would have limited its liability.
Regarding the burden of proving delivery of a conforming
ticket under Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention, the court in
Manion v. Pan American World Airways3 s held that the bur-
den is on the air carrier. In Manion the plaintiff sought to
recover damages for injuries sustained during a terrorist at-
tack on the defendant's aircraft.3 9 The defendant-airline
sought to limit its liability under the Warsaw Convention.
The plaintiff claimed, however, that under Article 3(2) the de-
fendant could not avail itself of the limited liability provision
because the plaintiff had not received a ticket on departure
from the Kennedy Airport where the flight originated."'
The court reasoned that the airline should bear the burden
of proving the ticket's delivery on departure because "asser-
tion of the Convention's liability limitations is an affirmative
defense" and "[t]he party asserting an affirmative defense
generally bears the burden of proof" on the issue." Moreover,
the court found that the airline is in the better position to
show delivery because it had access to records and copies of
tickets sold. On the other hand, it stated that the passenger's
*'Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
37 Id. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, article 3(2), which provides that "if a
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the Convention which exclude
or limit his liability." Id.
55 N.Y.2d 398, 434 N.E.2d 1060, 449 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
434 N.E.2d at 1061, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
,0 See supra note 39.
434 N.E.2d at 1062, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
1983]
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burden might be "insurmountable."4
The court in Manion further rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that while the plaintiff had not received a ticket con-
taining the requisite notice at the initiation of the first leg of
the journey, her receipt of the notice on commencement of the
second leg was sufficient under the Convention. The court
held that Article 3(2) requires the airline, if it desires to avail
itself of the limited liability provision, to deliver a ticket con-
taining the requisite notice prior to the initiation of the first
leg of the journey." The court supported its conclusion by
reading literally the relevant provision of the Convention
which states that the liability limitations are unavailable "if
the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered." 44 The court in Manion thus resolved a
significant issue concerning the proper interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention.
As to the time for filing action under Article 29 of the War-
saw Convention, 5 the court in Kahn v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.4' held that the two-year time limitation in Article 29 is a
condition precedent to bringing suit under the Convention
and cannot be tolled. In Kahn the plaintiffs were a parent and
two infant children who were injured when the defendant's
aircraft was hijacked. While the hijacking had occurred more
than two years prior to the date the plaintiffs filed suit, the
plaintiffs argued that the infant children's claim should not be
barred because their infancy tolled the time limitation.41
11 434 N.E.2d at 1062-63, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
4$ 434 N.E.2d at 1061-62, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 694-95.
4 ld. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, article 3(2)).
10 Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
1. The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not
brought within two years, reckoned from the date at arrival of the des-
tination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived,
or from the date on which the carriage stopped.
2. The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be deter-
mined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
49 Stat. at 3000. Compare Article 29(2) of the Convention as it appears at 137
L.N.T.S. 11, which requires that the period be determined by the "law of the court
seized of the case." Id.
44 82 A.D.2d 696, 443 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
11 The trial court granted the defendant-airline's motion for summary judgment
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Thus, the plaintiffs' argument equated the time limitation in
Article 29 with a statute of limitations.
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the time limitation essentially was a statute of limitations. It
instead endorsed the defendant's argument that the time limi-
tation was a condition precedent to suit "which bars any ac-
tion that has not been commenced within two years after ac-
crual.' 48 The court noted that the general rule for deciding
whether a statute contains a condition precedent or a statute
of limitation requires the court to determine whether the stat-
ute creates a cause of action.4" As the court explained, the
general rule is that "[i]f the statute containing the time limi-
tation creates the cause of action, then the limitation will gen-
erally be regarded as an ingredient of the cause of action and,
thus, a condition precedent to suit."' 0
After reviewing extensively the cases that previously had at-
tempted to apply the general rule, however, the court in Kahn
concluded that regardless of whether the Convention "cre-
ates" a cause of action, the time limitation is a condition pre-
cedent because that was the drafters' intent. Analyzing the
Convention's history, the court concluded that the drafters in-
tended to protect actions under the Convention from the un-
certainty of the various "tolling provisions" in the member
state's laws. Furthermore, the court decided that paragraph
two of Article 29, which requires a court to calculate the limi-
tation period under the law "of the court to which the case is
submitted," merely allowed it to determine "whether the
plaintiff had taken the necessary measures within the two
year period to invoke [the] ...court's jurisdiction over the
action." 1
The court in Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.52 subse-
with respect to the mother's claim, holding that her claim was barred by the two-year
limitation period. She did not pursue the claim on appeal.
48 443 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81.
19 Id. at 82.
50 Id.
"' Id. at 87.
586 A.D.2d 658, 446 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 767, 454
N.Y.S.2d 991 (1982).
19831
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quently applied the interpretation of Article 29(2) that it es-
poused in Kahn. In Seguritan the court held that the action
under the Convention was not commenced within the two-
year period, according to the law of the forum state, New
York. While the plaintiff filed the action within the two-year
period, the court held that it was not commenced within that
period because under New York laws an action commences
with the service of a summons. Because the plaintiff had
served the summons more than two years after his cause of
action accrued, the court held that the action was barred by
the time limitation."
Finally, in 1982 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the Convention's liability limitations
against an argument that the limitations were unconstitu-
tional. In In Re Aircrash In Bali, Indonesia,4 the plaintiffs
advanced their argument against the constitutionality of the
liability limitations. First, the plaintiffs argued that the limi-
tation was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive them
of due process. Second, they claimed the limitations deprived
them of equal protection of the laws. Finally, they argued that
the liability limitations unconstitutionally burdened their
right to travel.
With regard to the plaintiffs' first two arguments, the court
held that the liability limitation was merely an economic regu-
lation and, accordingly, was constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause unless arbitrary or unreasonable. Without de-
ciding whether the limitation was arbitrary or unreasonable,
the court addressed the plaintiffs' third argument, that the
limitation interfered with the constitutional right to travel.
Without ruling on any of the plaintiffs' constitutional argu-
ments, however, the court decided that an action under the
Warsaw Convention might not be the plaintiffs' exclusive
remedy. Furthermore, it held that the existence of an alterna-
"' The court cited Kahn for the proposition that the time limitation is a condition
precedent to suit which bars an action that is not brought within the two-year period.
See Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 696, 443 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981).
684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tive remedy would be dispositive since the constitutional ar-
guments under the Convention would fail if the plaintiffs had
access to an alternate source of compensation.
The court therefore reasoned that if compensation was
available under the Tucker Act" because the limitation on li-
ability amounted to a taking of the plaintiffs' property with-
out just compensation, it did not need to reach the constitu-
tional issues under the Convention.' While it refused to
decide whether the application of the liability limitations to
limit the plaintiffs' claims would amount to a "taking," the
court held that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to make
the determination. Further, it held that the plaintiffs had a
right to compensation if the Convention unreasonably im-
paired their claims. Thus, the Ninth Circuit carefully avoided
deciding whether the Warsaw Convention's liability limita-
tions are contrary to the guarantees in the United States
Constitution.
II. INSURANCE
As usual, during the past year several courts construed avia-
tion insurance policies to decide whether particular incidents
or persons were within the policies' coverage provisions. For
example, in Crawford v. Ranger Insurance Co.,57 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had to decide
whether an aviation insurance policy covered damages result-
ing from the death of a pilot that rented the insured aircraft.
The policy in question specifically provided that rental was a
permissible use of the aircraft in the "Purpose of Use" provi-
sions. The "Exclusions" section, however, excluded from cov-
erage damages due to the injury or death of a pilot.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the two
provisions were inconsistent, stating that the majority rule
was that "there is no inconsistency between a declaration that
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV 1980) (giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over
suits against the United States that are founded on the Constitution).
" The court raised the issue under the Tucker Act sua sponte, admittedly to avoid
the necessity of deciding the Warsaw Convention's constitutionality.
57 653 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).
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rental to pilots is a permissible use and a pilot exclusionary
clause."5 8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the declaration
provision was merely a condition precedent to coverage under
the policy. Thus, it concluded that if the aircraft were used in
a manner that was contrary to the declaration, the coverage
provisions would not apply and the insurer would not be
liable.59
Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the policy was ambiguous. The plaintiffs argued it was ambig-
uous because the "Insuring Agreements" section obligated the
insurer to compensate for the death of or injury to "any per-
son," while the "Exclusion" clause excepted pilots from the
coverage. Stating that "[m]ere complexity in an insurance pol-
icy does not make it ambiguous,"6 the Ninth Circuit held
that the policy in question contained no ambiguity. The court
reasoned that the policy was not one that "would mislead a
reasonably literate person who [took] the trouble to read it
with respect to the coverage [provided in the policy].""
Similarly, in Doyen v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,62 the Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that a pilot exclusionary clause was not
inconsistent with a "Purpose of Use" clause that permitted
rental to pilots. In Doyen, however, the policy expressly cov-
ered the "insured," which it defined to include persons oper-
ating the aircraft with the "named insured's" permission,
while it excluded from coverage any person operating the air-
craft pursuant to a rental agreement with the named insured.
Thus, the question for the court in Doyen was whether the
deceased pilot, who was fatally injured while operating the
aircraft under a rental agreement, was an "insured" under the
policy. The court held that the policy's unambiguous language
dictated that the pilot was not covered.68
" Id. at 1251.
" Id.
" Id. at 1250.
" Id. at 1251. The Ninth Circuit applied Hawaiian law, which requires that courts
resolve ambiguities in insurance policies in favor of the insured. See Maskai v. Co-
lumbia Cas. Co., 48 Hawaii 136, 395 P.2d 927, 929 (1964).
" 416 So. 2d 1337 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
" Id. at 1341. The court relied upon Jahrman v. Valley Air Park, Inc., 333 So. 2d
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In Lloyds Underwriters v. Southeast Skyways Inc.,6" the
operator of an air taxi service sought to recover under an in-
surance policy that insured the entire fleet of aircraft that the
operator based in his business. According to the policy's
terms, however, most of his aircraft were insured only during
the summer months, the insured's "peak season." '65 The air-
craft in question had crashed during October, and it was not
expressly covered by the policy. The insured claimed, never-
theless, that the aircraft was a "substitute aircraft" under the
policy, which extended coverage to aircraft that the insured
acquired as "replacements" for expressly covered aircraft. The
"Substitute Aircraft" clause in the policy provided that if an
aircraft "owned by the named assured" were withdrawn be-
cause of "breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction"
the insurance coverage would extend to another similar, tem-
porary aircraft "not so owned" while it served as a
substitute."6
The court, construing the policy, decided that "owned," in
this particular case, meant "leased" since the insured leased
all of its aircraft from a third party. It reasoned that the
"Substitute Aircraft" provision therefore would not apply if
the insured owned the substitute aircraft "in the same capac-
ity" that it "owned" the original aircraft.2 Thus, the court
refused to hold that the "Substitute Aircraft" provision cov-
ered the aircraft in question. It stated that "the accident air-
craft . . . was 'owned' by Skyways in the same way that it
'owned' the aircraft temporarily out of service. Both aircraft
were leased to Skyways. .. .
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Husker Aviation, Inc.,"9 the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska construed an airport fixed based op-
712 (La. Ct. App. 1976), writ denied, 338 So. 2d 293 (La. 1976), which construed an
aviation insurance policy containing a clause almost identical to the clause in Doyen
and held that the policy did not cover a pilot who rents the aircraft from the named
insured. Id.
:4 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,380 (D. Alaska 1982).
as The insured operator ran a sight-seeing service in Alaska.
16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,382.
6 Id. at 18,383.
68 Id.
19 211 Neb. 21, 317 N.W.2d 745 (1982).
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erator's (FBO) liability policy. The plaintiff in Husker sued
the FBO, claiming that the FBO's negligence in operating a
pilot training school was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
decedent's death. Because the accident aircraft was unin-
sured, the FBO sought to avail itself of the coverage under its
fixed base operator's liability policy. The insurer denied that
the accident was covered, however, relying upon a policy ex-
clusion that excepted injury arising out of the maintenance,
ownership, operation or use of any aircraft rented to the
insured.
Using what the Nebraska court called an "ingenious"70 ar-
gument, the FBO and the decedent's representative sought to
avoid the policy exclusion, claiming that the injury did not
arise from the aircraft's operation. They argued instead that
the injury arose from the FBO's negligence in training the de-
cedent and in permitting him to operate the aircraft when he
was unqualified as a pilot. The court reasoned that regardless
of what was the "contributing cause" of the accident, the acci-
dent would not have occurred if the decedent had not been
"operating" the aircraft.7 1 The court therefore concluded that
the injury resulted from the specific activity that the policy
excluded, and thus, the accident was not covered.72
A California Court of Appeal had occasion during 1982 to
construe similar language in a policy that expressly covered
damages arising from the insured aircraft's ownership, main-
tenance or use.78 In Transport Indemnity Co. v. Schrack the
insured sought indemnification for damages that resulted
from a fire that occurred while the insured was refueling the
aircraft. The insurer reimbursed the insured for the value of
the aircraft but claimed that it was not liable under the policy
for damages to third parties' property although the damages
10 317 N.W.2d at 748.
71 Id.
" Id. The court further rejected the argument that the policy was ambiguous, stat-
ing that it would not "create an ambiguity simply to afford coverage where a clear
reading of the policy would otherwise deny coverage.' Id. at 749.
78 Transport Indem. Co. v. Schrack, 131 Cal. App. 3d 149, 182 Cal. Rptr. 256
(1982).
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resulted from the fire. 4 The insurer argued that the policy's
express coverage provision was inapplicable because the fire,
while it might have occurred "incident" to the aircraft's main-
tenance, did not "arise out of" the maintenance.7 5
The court, noting that the policy did not "purport to regu-
late . . . the standard of causation,"'7' decided that the sole
issue for it to resolve was the meaning of "arising out of." Ob-
serving that no court had as yet construed the phrase in an
aviation insurance policy, the court analogized to cases that
had construed automobile insurance policies containing the
phrase. It relied upon cases holding that "arising out of"
means "originating from," "flowing from," "growing out of" or
"having connection with. 7 7 Using this broad, general defini-
tion, the California court held that "[t]he fueling of an air-
craft patently has a 'connection with' its 'use' or 'mainte-
nance.' "178 It, thus, concluded that the policy covered the
damages that resulted from the incident.
In Swish Manufacturing Southeast v. Manhattan Fire and
Marine Insurance Co., 79 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals absolved an insurer from liability under a policy provi-
sion that excluded from coverage damages due to the air-
craft's "conversion."80 The owner of the insured aircraft had
loaned it to another corporation, pursuant to a lease agree-
ment that prohibited the lessee from using the aircraft for un-
lawful purposes. Acting contrary to the lease, the lessee
piloted the aircraft to the Bahamas for the purpose of smug-
gling marijuana into the United States. The aircraft was dam-
aged when it was seized by government officials in the Baha-
mas, and the owner demanded indemnification from the
74 The policy obligated the insurer to indemnify the insured for all amounts the
insured became liable to pay as damages because of property damage "caused by an
occurrence and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the aircraft
." 131 Cal. App. at 151, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (emphasis supplied by the court).
75 Id.
76 131 Cal. App. at 152, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
77 Id. (quoting Red Ball Motor Freight v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co., 189 F.2d 374,
378 (5th Cir. 1951)).
70 131 Cal. App. at 152, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
79 675 F.2d 1218 (11th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 1219.
1983]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
insurer.
The insurer defended on the ground that the lessee's unlaw-
ful use of the plane constituted "conversion" within the policy
exclusion.' The court agreed, reasoning that under the com-
mon law misuse or "use beyond that [to] which the owner
consented" may constitute conversion. To support its holding,
the court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 228 which states that "[olne who is authorized to make a
particular use of a chattel, and uses it in a manner exceeding
the authorization, is subject to liability for conversion to an-
other whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby
seriously violated."8 2 The court in Swish Manufacturing thus
concluded that the policy exclusion applied and denied the
plaintiff recovery under the policy.
With respect to policy exclusions generally, the Oregon
Court of Appeals recently announced its intention to adhere
to a strong precedent in other jurisdictions holding that an
insurer need not prove a causal connection between a policy
exclusion and an aircraft accident to avail itself of the exclu-
sionary clause.88 In Ochs v. Avemco Insurance Co., the policy
excluded coverage for property damage to an aircraft that did
not have a current "airworthiness certificate."" The plaintiff
sought to recover under the policy for damage sustained while
the plaintiff attempted to land the insured aircraft which had
a broken tail wheel spring.
The plaintiff admitted that the aircraft did not possess the
requisite airworthiness certificate, but alleged that the defen-
dant could not avail itself of the policy exclusion because it
had not proved that a causal connection existed between the
accident and the exclusion.8 ' The court, acknowledging that
" Id. The policy exclusion stated that the coverage did not extend to "loss or dam-
age due to conversion, embezzlement or secretion by any person in possession of the
aircraft under a bailment, lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or
other encumbrance, nor for any loss or damage resulting therefrom" (emphasis sup-
plied by the court). Id.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 228 (1965).
- Ochs v. Avemco Inc. Co., 540 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d 421 (1981).
636 P.2d at 422.
The plaintiff maintained that the inspection required to obtain a certificate of
airworthiness would not have revealed the particular defect that caused the damage
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some precedent supported the plaintiff's position, found that
the "better reasoned" authority was contrary." It accordingly
held that an aircraft insurer may exclude from coverage dam-
ages to any aircraft that does not possess a valid and current
certificate of airworthiness.
The Florida Court of Appeal took the contrary position,
however, in Pickett v. Woods.s8 In Pickett, the policy, like-
wise, contained an exclusion for aircraft that did not possess a
current airworthiness certificate. In Pickett, however, the
crash that resulted in the damage was caused by pilot error, as
opposed to mechanical failure. Moreover, in Pickett, a Florida
statute,88 which was directly on point, was dispositive. The
statute provided that the insured's breach or violation of a
condition contained in an insurance contract does not render
the contract void unless the breach or violation "increased the
hazard by any means within the control of the insured.""
Finding that the crash resulted from pilot error, and not from
the lack of a certificate of airworthiness, the Florida court
held that the insurer could not rely on the exclusion to deny
coverage.90
With regard to the ongoing disputes between primary and
excess insurers, the California Court of Appeal in Olympic In-
surance Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Insurance Co.' 1 held
that a secondary insurer does not become liable until the pri-
mary insurance coverage is exhausted despite the fact that the
insured's liability exceeds the secondary policy's threshold
amount. In Olympic, three insurance policies were disputed.
Two of the policies provided primary coverage; one provided
coverage to $20,000, and the other provided coverage to $1
million. The third policy provided secondary coverage from
because the inspection normally did not incluce tail wheel springs. 636 P.2d at 422-
23.
86 Id. at 423.
87 404 So. 2d at 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409(2) (West 1979) (repealed 1982).
89 Id.
00 404 So. 2d at 1153.
91 126 Cal. App. 3d 593, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1981).
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$20,000 to $1 million. The insured settled the action" that
gave rise to the insurers' liability under the policies for
$495,000.
The insured sought to recover under all three policies and
requested a declaratory judgment that the insurers should
prorate the liability among them. The excess insurer claimed,
however, that it should not become liable under the secondary
policy until the primary coverage was exhausted. The court
agreed and held that a secondary insurer does not become lia-
ble under a policy until the underlying primary insurance is
exhausted.2' It held that this principle applied as well when
the secondary policy contemplated that the insured had less
primary coverage than actually existed. Moreover, the court
reasoned that the secondary insurer was not liable for the
costs of defending the action under the policies because the
primary insurers had the primary duty to defend."
Regarding a breach of warranty endorsement in an aviation
insurance policy, the court in Underwriters at Lloyds v.
United Bank Alaska" held that the breach of warranty en-
dorsement is a separate contract between the insurer and the
lien holder, designed to protect the lienholder against acts of
the insured.6 Thus, in United Bank, the court allowed the
lien holder to recover from the insurer although the insured,
through unilateral cancellation of his policy, had invalidated
the coverage with respect to the accident aircraft.97 The court
reasoned that the-Breach of Warranty clause specifically pro-
tected the lienholder against the insured's unilateral cancella-
tion of the policy to the detriment of the lienholder without
effective notice to the lienholder."e
Various other decisions during 1981-82 addressed an avia-
" The suit against the insured was based on wrongful death and resulted from the
collision with a commercial airliner of an aircraft operated by the insured's agent.
" 126 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
" 126 Cal. App. 3d at 601, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
" 636 P.2d 615 (Alas. 1981).
" Id. at 618.
" Id. The insured had leased or sold the aircraft to a third party and had deleted
the aircraft from the insurance reporting form.
" Id.
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tion insurer's obligation to pay interest on judgments, the in-
surer's liability to subsidiary corporations and the extent to
which an insured's misrepresentation will void a policy's cov-
erage. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp.," for exam-
ple, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals construed a clause
in an aviation insurance contract that obligated the insurer to
"pay . . .all interest accruing after the entry of judgment
[against the insured] until the company has paid, tendered or
deposited in court, such part of such judgment as does not
exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon .... ,0
The court held that although the insurer's liability under the
policy was only $995,750, the policy provision obligated the
insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment against the in-
sured which was in the amount of $6,570,690. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that while a minority of jurisdictions have
limited the phrase "all interest accruing after the entry of
judgment" to include only interest on the amount of the in-
surer's total liability under the policy,"' the majority view is
contrary.102 The court thus followed the view prevailing in the
majority of jurisdictions.
A second issue the court resolved in Allegheny Airlines con-
cerned whether an "additional insured" is a "named insured"
for purposes of a policy provision that excluded coverage for
aircraft that belonged to the "named insured".103 In Alle-
gheny, the policy that was in dispute was an excess umbrella
liability policy acquired by a parent corporation which named
the subsidiary as an "additional insured." Because the acci-
dent aircraft was owned by the subsidiary corporation, the
question for the court to decide was whether the policy exclu-
663 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1981).
100 Id. at 755.
101 The court cited the following cases as espousing the minority view: Standard
Accident Ins. Co. v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952); Snider v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 360 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va. 1973); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Hotkins, 8 Misc. 2d 296, 170 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1957).
102 For the majority interpretation, the court cited, inter alia: Pawlik v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1962); United States Auto. Ass'n v. Ros-
sum, 241 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1957); America Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fulcher, 201 F.2d 751
(4th Cir. 1953).
103 663 F.2d at 759.
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sion applied, which depended on whether the subsidiary was a
"named insured." The court held that the subsidiary was, in-
deed, a named insured, as evidenced by the parties' intent as
expressed in the policy. The court thus, denied that the sub-
sidiary had a right to recover under the excess umbrella
policy.
Finally, in Overturf v. Aero Insurance Co.,104 the Fifth Cir-
cuit, applying Louisiana law, reaffirmed in 1982 that an in-
sured who misrepresents his pilot status on an aviation insur-
ance application makes a material misrepresentation which
will void coverage.101 The insured in Overturf represented that
he was a certified private pilot, while, in fact, he was merely a
student pilot. After he was forced to crash land the insured
aircraft, the insured sued to recover under the policy. The in-
surer defended on the ground that it would not have extended
coverage if the plaintiff had disclosed his true pilot status on
the insurance application. Further, it claimed that the misrep-
resentation was material and excused it from honoring the
policy. The Fifth Circuit agreed and denied the recovery
sought by the plaintiff.'"e
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In Hatstead v. United States,1 07 the plaintiffs sued Jep-
pesen & Co., a manufacturer of aeronautical charts, and the
United States. The complaint alleged in part that aeronautical
charts sold by Jeppesen to the decedent's employer and car-
ried by the decedent while piloting a small private plane were
defective. It further alleged that the defects caused the dece-
dent to crash into a mountain ridge in West Virginia. 1°8 Both
'04 686 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1982).
I" Id. at 355.
106 Id.
'" 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982).
Id. at 784-85. On August 31, 1975, a plane carrying Willard Vernon Wahlund,
his father, and his son, Erik, crashed into a mountain ridge in West Virginia, killing
all three. Plaintiffs, administrator and administratix of Willard's and Erik's respec-
tive estates, filed separate complaints. The administrator of Willard's estate, the pi-
lot, alleged that the accident resulted from the negligence of federal air traffic con-
trollers operating out of Dulles Airport in Virginia and from a defect in the
navigational chart manufactured by Jeppesen. The administratix of Erik's estate
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complaints sought to recover from Jeppesen under strict prod-
ucts liability doctrine. 09 The court observed that whether
strict liability would apply depended on whether the charts
were classified as a service or as a product.110 Because Jep-
pesen mass produced and distributed its charts, the court de-
termined that its activity was within the scope of The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 402A,111 because the
manufacturer was selling a product rather than a service.11'
Accordingly, the court held that the chart manufacturer was
subject to the doctrine of strict liability in tort.113
An interesting attempt to obtain the benefits of the doc-
trine of strict liability failed in Gobhai v. KLM.1 4 In Gobhai
the plaintiff's son, as a passenger on a flight from Amsterdam
to New York, received a pair of slippers from the "Royal"
Dutch Airways, KLM, which the son testified were "part of a
package" given to those passengers flying "first class."'11 Nine
months after the flight, the plaintiff slipped and fell while
wearing the slippers and, subsequently, brought suit against
the airline for his injuries.1 "
The trial court, denying KLM's motion for summary judg-
ment, found that an issue of fact existed as to whether KLM
had sold the slippers to the plaintiff's son."17 On appeal, how-
ever, the appellate court determined that KLM did not de-
sign, manufacture or sell the allegedly defective footwear. 18
Furthermore, the court found that the airline was not in the
business of manufacturing or selling slippers, but rather, was
in the business of providing air transportation.' Finding that
made the same allegations and additionally alleged that the pilot was negligent. Id.
I Id. at 785.
:10 Id. at 789.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
1" 535 F. Supp. at 791.
:is Id.
14 85 A.D.2d 556, 445 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
115 445 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
11 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 447. The court explained that the doctrine of strict products liability im-
poses liability without proof of fault upon manufacturers and vendors who are in the
business of selling defective products that cause injuries. Id. at 446.
119 445 N.Y.S. at 447.
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the distribution of slippers was incidental to the basic service
provided by KLM, the court held that the incidental ameni-
ties were not subject to strict liability standards.12 0
One notable case dealing with a component manufacturer's
liability is Varig Airlines v. Walter Kidde & Co.121 Varig sued
Boeing Aircraft and its component supplier, Weber Aircraft, a
division of Walter Kidde & Co., for the loss of a 707 that
crashed outside Paris in 1973.122 The accident occurred after
dense smoke completely filled the aircraft, suffocating many
passengers and obscuring the pilot's vision.123 The French
Commission which investigated the accident found that the
probable cause was a fire that apparently broke out in the
used towel receptacle in a lavatory. '2  Defendant Weber Air-
craft had manufactured the lavatory sink and cabinet unit, in-
cluding the towel receptacle.2 8
Varig sought to recover from Weber on several theories, in-
cluding (1) negligent design and manufacture of the sink and
dispenser unit, (2) post-delivery negligence, and (3) strict lia-
bility in tort."' The Ninth Circuit found no substantial evi-
dence in the record supporting post-delivery negligence. 12
Furthermore, it refused to apply the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity,128 relying on its precedent in Scandinavian Airline Sys-
tem v. United Aircraft Corp.,29 which held that the strict lia-
bility doctrine does not apply to negotiated transactions
between large commercial enterprises.' 0 The court stated that
110 Id. The evidence revealed that the slippers were for KLM's first class passen-
gers. Id.
Is- 690 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982).
's" Id. at 1236.
1*3 Id.
124 Id.
122 Id. at 1236-37.
Is$ Id.
127 Id. at 1239.
228 Id. at 1239-40.
129 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
IN Id. at 427-29. In a prior appeal of Varig Airlines v. Walter Kidde & Co., 690
F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit had applied the rule in Scandinavian
Airline between Varig and Boeing to hold that strict liability doctrine did not apply
to their dealings with each other. See Varig Airlines v. Boeing Co., 691 F.2d 746 (9th
Cir. 1981).
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the airline, the aircraft manufacturer and the manufacturer of
the component were all negotiating from positions of rela-
tively equal economic strength and were able to allocate their
risks by contract.131
Regarding whether Weber had negligently designed or man-
ufactured the component, the court absolved Weber of liabil-
ity because it found that Weber manufactured the unit ac-
cording to Boeing's design specifications. Moreover, it
observed that the record contained no evidence that the fire
occurred or spread because of some act or failure attributable
to Weber.'13 The court further concluded that the record con-
tained no evidence that Weber had any authority over the
component's design or that it was otherwise responsible for
the disaster. s The court noted, however, that Weber would
be unable to defend on the ground that it lacked "design re-
sponsibility" if a. defect in the component were so obvious
that Weber knew or should have known that the component
was dangerous.13 '
One interesting issue that arises in products liability cases
concerns the application of a state's statute of repose to bar a
products liability action. In Catlette v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.,"' the court applied the Indiana ten-year statute of re-
pose'3 6 to bar a suit for damages arising out of a 1978 accident
involving a DC-3, originally sold by the defendant in 1944.'"
The court held that the statute applied to product actions
based on negligence, strict liability and willful and wanton
misconduct.13 It further held that the statute did not apply
11 601 F.2d at 427-29.
"' 690 F.2d at 1239.
133 Id. at 1238.
I' d. at 1238 n.6.
18 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,128 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
"' IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5 (1976) provides in part that any product liability action
must be commenced within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial
user.
"7 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,129. The plane was first purchased by the United
States Army Air Corps, and delivery was accepted on February 5, 1944. See supra
note 137.
18 Id. at 18,130-31. The court relied on IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-1 (1976), which states
that it governs all products liability actions, including those in which the theory of
liability is negligence or strict liability in tort.
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to actions for breach of warranty in contract. It found, how-
ever, that privity was lacking between the plaintiffs and the
manufacturer and, thus, denied recovery on the contract the-
ory as well.18 9
IV. AIR CARRIERS
Worthy of special note in any discussion of air disaster liti-
gation is Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.'40 Arnold was a
consolidation of suits against Eastern and the United States
that resulted from the crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 212
near Charlotte, North Carolina in 1974. The district court
consolidated for trial three personal injury and wrongful
death suits against Eastern, Eastern's third-party claims for
contribution against the United States, and the insurance car-
rier's claims against the United States for contribution.1 4'
The trial court rendered judgments against Eastern for
$3,027,500, $1,137,500 and $847,000.142 The court refused,
however, to allow punitive damages against Eastern. Finally,
the trial court refused to allow either Eastern or its insurance
carrier to recover from the United States.' 43
On appeal, Eastern argued that it had been prejudiced by
the consolidation because the jury learned of the existence
and apparent scope of its insurance coverage. The insurance
carrier complained, on the other hand, that it was prejudiced
by evidence of Eastern's allegedly gross culpability and of the
substantial injuries suffered by the crash victims.' In assess-
ing these complaints, the court noted that the risks of
prejudice and possible confusion of the jury were obvious risks
that the trial court was obliged to weigh. Had the trial court
failed to carefully consider the risks and their alternative, the
appellate court concluded, the trial court would have abused
it's discretion.' " The court found, however, that the record
:3 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,131.
40 681 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1982).
"' Id. at 190-91.
I' ld. at 191.
:43 Id.
44 Id. at 192.
1 Id. at 193.
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showed that the court had carefully considered these risks.1"
Holding that the consolidation was proper, the court con-
cluded that the specific risks of prejudice and possible confu-
sion were outweighed by the opposing risks of "inconsistent
adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the burden
upon the parties, witnesses and available judicial resources
posed by multiple suits, the length of time required to con-
clude multiple suits as against a single suit, and the relative
expense to all concerned of the single-trial/multiple-trial al-
ternatives. '""" While acknowledging that these risks existed,
the trial court had reasoned that it guarded against these risks
by giving the appropriate instructions to the jury.""
Both the district court and the circuit court summarily
dealt with Eastern's insurance/prejudice argument by noting
that it would be "unrealistic to assume either that the jury
did not know that insurance coverage existed or that, if it
were known to exist, it would likely inflate any damage award
made against a corporate defendant such as Eastern."149 The
court similarly dismissed another of Eastern's arguments that
certain of opposing counsel's remarks and arguments to the
jury were improper and tainted the jury verdicts, requiring
that they be set aside.150 Nevertheless, the court stated that
the ultimate issue on appeal was not the impropriety of coun-
sel's conduct, but rather, the propriety of the trial court's re-
sponse to it.1 1 The court further stated that review of trial
court discretion in matters of counsel misconduct is especially





1'0 Id. at 194. To appreciate the importance of the court's holding, that while im-
proper, the remarks did not require reversal, the reader should note the allegedly
objectionable comments and remarks, which are set out in the text of the opinion at
pages 195-96. The court described the challenged comments and remarks by stating
that. "[b]eyond its legal impropriety, it was in substantial part inelegant, tasteless,
offensive, arguably violative of professional standards and, perhaps most deserving of
condemnation, irresponsibly threatening to any verdicts that might in the end be ob-
tained by offending counsel's clients." Id. at 195.
151 Id. at 195.
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tion to assess the impact of such conduct upon the jury.1'5
The court, therefore, concluded that the court's admonitions
to offending counsel and its cautionary instructions to the jury
were sufficient under the circumstances. 53
Finally, the court addressed the size of two of the verdicts
($3 million and $1.1 million) and held that it could not set
aside a verdict for "mere excessiveness. '"I ' The court stated
that it had authority to reverse verdicts only if they were "un-
toward, inordinate, unreasonable or outrageous" in relation to
the record.155 After reviewing the evidence of the injuries of
the respective plaintiffs, the court concluded that the verdicts
should not be set aside. | 5e
Regarding the liability of an air carrier for breach of a con-
tract to transport, the court in Vick v. National Airlines,
Inc.,157 allowed a husband and wife to recover from National
Airlines. The plaintiffs contracted with National to fly them
non-stop from New Orleans to Miami, where they intended to
depart to the Caribbean for a vacation.1 8 Because of bad
weather, the incoming National flight was delayed and had to
overfly a scheduled stop at Pensacola on its way to New Orle-
ans.I's Accordingly, after the plaintiffs' flight left New Orleans
on a purportedly non-stop flight to Miami, National an-
nounced that it would stop in Pensacola to deplane the Pen-
sacola passengers who were still on board.'"e As a result of bad
weather in Pensacola, the plaintiffs' flight was further delayed
causing the plaintiffs to miss their connections in Miami. As a
result of this missed connection the plaintiffs contended that
I" Id. at 194-95.
I' d. at 198-200.
" ld. at 201.
'" Id. The court's test for reviewing large awards is derived expressly from
Grunenthal v. Long Island R. R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
. '" 681 F.2d at 200-04. The court also discussed several other minor issues in the
case, including, 1) the admission of evidence of air crashes occuring after the one at
issue in the case, and 2) the trial courts use of remittitur to remedy an excessive
damage award which was based at least in part on pain and suffering. Id. at 204-06.





their vacation was ruined.161 In sustaining an award for out-
of-pocket expenses and $2,500 each for pain and suffering, 162
the court held that the airline acted improperly by failing ade-
quately to inform the plaintiffs of the changed flight schedule
and by being callous to the problems caused by the delays and
in deciding to make an unannounced stop enroute in bad
weather."'
On the issue of refusal of passage, an award of $500,000
against American Airlines was upheld in Adamson v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc.1 4 In Adamson the plaintiff arrived at the
airport about 45 minutes before the flight in an ambulance
and was transferred to a wheelchair, as she was paralyzed
from the waist down. She was observed to be carrying a urine
bag attached to the business end of a Foley catheter and was
obviously very ill and in great pain. Claiming to have been
caught by surprise, the airline declined to board the plaintiff
for a three-hour flight to New York. As a result, the plaintiff
claimed that she was injured because the treatment she was to
receive at her destination was delayed.
In sustaining the jury verdict, the court held that there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to have found that the airline's
representatives were aware of the plaintiff's problem in ad-
vance. It further found that the jury could have concluded
that the airline could have made arrangements for the plain-
tiff if she had been timely informed of the airline's require-
ments for transport." The court also found that because the
61 Id. Mrs. Vick's undisputed testimony was that flying in bad weather affects her
emotionally. Thus, the rough landing in Pensacola, in addition to not receiving infor-
mation about takeoff times and connecting flights caused her pain and suffering.
162 The actual language used by the trial court was "for their pain and suffering,
mental anguish, inconvenience and inability to carry out their vacation plans ......
Id. at 384. The court also explained that in Louisiana, non-pecuniary damages are
allowable in a breach of contract action when "the contract has as a principal object
the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment". Id, at 385.
113 Id. at 386. The court specifically noted that National personnel failed to arrange
alternate accommodations for the plaintiffs when they missed their connecting flight.
Id.
1 87 A.D.2d 785, 449 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
165 49 N.Y.S.2d at 488. In a memorandum opinion, J. Silverman dissented. He
would have reversed the judgment on the ground that an airline has discretion to
refuse to accept passengers under 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976). Silverman stated that a
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airline's representatives were aware or should have been aware
of the plaintiff's condition and the urgency of the flight, they
had a duty to inquire sufficiently about the plaintiff's condi-
tion to determine whether airline requirements had been met.
The court in Cordero v. Cia Mexicana De Aviacion166 ad-
dressed a similar issue. In Cordero the court reinstated a jury
verdict against an airline for refusing to reboard a passenger
who, the airline claimed, had insulted the Captain and a
Flight Attendant on a previous leg of the journey.""a The pas-
senger claimed that it was a case of mistaken identity.168 Cor-
dero is noteworthy because the Ninth Circuit ruled that, al-
though an air carrier has been empowered by 49 U.S.C. §
1511(a) to refuse passage, the carrier is not immune from lia-
bility if its decision to deny passage is unreasonable or irra-
tional."1 9 The court found that there was sufficient evidence
to show that the airline failed to make even a "cursory in-
quiry" into the plaintiff's situation. It, therefore, held that
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the air carrier's
exclusion of the plaintiff was unreasonable.170 The court bor-
rowed from the Second Circuit a "reasonable man" test to de-
termine the propriety of an airline's decision to refuse trans-
portation to an individual.17 1 The test requires the fact-finder
to look at the facts known by the airline's representatives and
the circumstances surrounding the decision at the time the
representatives made it, rather than the facts disclosed after
negligence standard is inappropriate to judge a decision made by airline representa-
tives to refuse transportation to individuals when those representatives were acting
"in good faith." Id. at 489.
166 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982).
107 Id. at 670. Although the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for unjust discrimi-
nation in violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. §1374 (b)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the trial court judge granted judgment notwithstanding the
verdict under 49 U.S.C. §1511(a) (1976), which allows airline representatives the dis-
cretion to refuse transportation to a person "when, in the opinion of the carrier, such
transporation would or might be inimical to safety of flight." The trial court judge
found that the aircarrier's decision not to transport need not be reasonable. Id. at
670-71.
I" Id.
16 Id. at 672.
170 Id.
7 Id. at 671 (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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the decision was made.17 2
V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
As occurs frequently in cases involving aviation accidents,
the plaintiffs in Pierce v. United States 7 8 were unable to pre-
sent proof of the actual or immediate cause of the crash. The
plaintiffs sued the federal government claiming that the pilot,
who perished in the accident, encountered an embedded thun-
derstorm of which he had not been warned by the flight ser-
vice station (FSS). They further alleged that the thunder-
storm overstressed his small aircraft and caused the crash.
The government contended that the pilot, whose license re-
quired that he fly only under visual flight rules (VFR), be-
came disoriented in conditions which required instrument
flight rules (IFR). Moreover, the government argued that the
pilot had been warned about the conditions and that he over-
reacted and overstressed his aircraft.
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
proved that the thunderstorm caused the airframe failure and
the consequent crash and, thus, that the plaintiffs had failed
to meet their burden of proof."' Because the plaintiffs failed
to prove actual causation, the district court found that it was
unnecessary to make any findings regarding the federal gov-
ernment's negligence or proximate cause. In a subsequent
memorandum that denied the plaintiffs' motion for rehearing,
the district court stated that the plaintiff failed to prove that
weather, as opposed to pilot error, caused the crash. 7 5
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' in-
ability to demonstrate the immediate cause of the crash did
not preclude the possibility that the government might have
been liable.17 6 The court pointed out that the plaintiffs had
always maintained that the FSS caused the pilot to operate
the aircraft in a place where weather endAngered it and that
179 681 F.2d at 672.
'7 679 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1982).
174 Id. at 629.
17 Id.
17 Id. at 621.
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while the pilot might have become disoriented after entering
clouds, the government's negligence was at least a concurrent
proximate cause of the crash.177 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that because an aircraft accident may have more than
one proximate cause,1 78 it was not necessary for the plaintiffs
to prove that the government's negligence was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident."'
The court further stated that it recognized that it was diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to prove the actual or immediate cause of a
crash, especially when there are no survivors. It therefore rea-
soned that the plaintiffs' inability to show which of two pro-
jected causes was the actual cause did not mean that he had
failed to bear his burden of proof. The court further stated
that the plaintiff could present a prima facie case by estab-
lishing that the government had breached a duty and that the
breach was either the sole cause or a concurrent cause of the
accident.180 Indicating that the trial court properly could
reach a decision on the evidence, the court noted that a deci-
sion that is founded on circumstantial evidence which is of-
fered to support one of two opposing theories is not based on
improper speculation, particularly when the court has heard
expert testimony on the evidence. The district court's judg-
ment was vacated and the case remanded for further
findings.18'
Proximate causation was again an issue in McCullough v.
United States.182 McCullough was an action by the widow of
an Eastern Air Lines check airman. The airman was fatally
injured while he was conducting a line check on the flight en-
177 Id.
"'7 679 F.2d at 622.
171 Id. at 621. The court cited Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 237
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). In Ingham the United States was held
liable concurrently with Eastern due to the failure of an air traffic controller to relay
necessary weather information. The court also cited Himmler v. United States, 474 F.
Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1979), in which the failure of a controller to maintain continuous
communication with a VFR pilot caught in IFR conditions was held a substantial
contributing factor to the cause of the accident.
'Id.
I81 d. at 623.
'n 538 F. Supp. 694 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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gineer of Eastern Flight 66, which crashed at Kennedy Inter-
national Airport in 1975. In McCullough, the government de-
fended against the plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment by alleging that Eastern's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the accident, that the plaintiff had failed
to establish the proximate cause of the accident, and that the
decedent was contributorily negligent.183 Specifically, the de-
fendant charged that the decedent had participated in con-
duct that disrupted the discipline of the cockpit.
The court, holding for the plaintiff, found that the air traffic
controllers' negligence in failing to relay a wind shear report,
to solicit pilot weather reports, or to report thunderstorm ac-
tivity was the proximate cause of the crash. 8' Regarding the
government's various defenses, the court ruled that the record
contained no evidence that the decedent engaged in conduct
that was disruptive to cockpit discipline. Moreover, the court
ruled that the decedent had no legal duty to prevent others
from disrupting the cockpit because the duty to prevent dis-
ruptions, the court concluded, rested with the Captain." 5
With regard to sole proximate causation, the court found that
any acts by Eastern crewmen that contributed to the crash
were entirely foreseeable and were consequences of the con-
trollers' negligence. Thus, the court concluded that the negli-
gence of Eastern's personnel was not a superceding or inter-
vening cause of the accident.8
Garbarino v. United States s8 was a suit by the administra-
trix of the estate of a passenger who died in the crash of a
Cessna 177. The plaintiff claimed that the FAA had negli-
gently failed to promulgate regulations requiring that certifi-
cation procedures for aircraft include a test for "crashworthi-
ness". The Sixth Circuit concluded that the action against the
government was barred by the "discretionary function" excep-
'" Id. at 695-96.
184 Id. at 698-700.
188 Id. at 698. The court pointed out that Mr. McCullough was not a required crew
member and his role involved observation, as opposed to supervision. Id.
188 Id. at 700.
187 666 F.2d 1961 (6th Cir. 1981).
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tion' 8s to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court found that
the section of the Federal Aviation Act that requires the Ad-
ministrator of the FAA to promulgate safety regulations' 9
leaves the particulars of the regulations to the Administrator's
discretion. The court stated that the statute required only
that the Administrator set minimum safety standards. It fur-
ther stated that deciding what those standards were and
whether they should include crashworthiness criteria is the
"type of policy decision that falls squarely within the discre-
tionary function exception."1 90
The court also found that the plaintiff's claim that the FAA
had negligently delegated inspection duties to the manufac-
turer of the aircraft was barred by the discretionary function
exception."' While holding that the delegation was not negli-
gent, the court considered whether the FAA, having required
others to perform the inspection, is responsible in damages for
a negligent inspection that causes injury. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that although a manufacturer, airline, or mechanic
could be liable for negligent inspections, the government is
not vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the inspections. The court premised its holding on the
policy against extending the government's liability so as to
make it a joint insurer of all activity subject to safety
inspections. 92
'" 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides that the following claims, inter alia, are ex-
empt from coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act:
a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
Id.
"' 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
150 666 F.2d at 1065. See Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975) (the
exception bars claims that the United States is liable for failure of its officials to
impose a more strict set of air safety standards) and Fielder v. United States, 423 F.
Supp. 77 (C. D. Cal. 1976) (the exception bars claims for failure of the FAA to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations which promote the safety of hang gliders).
"1 666 F.2d at 1065.
"' Id. at 1066.
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In Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc.195 the plaintiff brought suit,
as the fiduciary of the estate of an individual who was killed
when his parachute failed to open-during a jump, against the
FAA and Jump Shack. The FAA had issued Jump Shack a
technical standard order (TSO) authorization that permitted
Jump Shack to identify its parachutes by using the applicable
TSO marking. The court found that the suit against the FAA
for granting the TSO was barred by the discretionary function
exception 9" because the role of the FAA in granting TSO au-
thorizations involves considerable latitude for policy judgment
and discretion.
The court found that the action was also barred by the mis-
representation exception" 5 to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The court reasoned that even if the decedent had relied on
the allegedly negligent TSO authorization his reliance was
only upon the government's communication of facts. The
court held that if the injury did not result from either the
negligent conduct or the negligent performance of operational
tasks it was barred by the misrepresentation exception.'"
Federal Express Corp. v. State of Rhode Island197 involved
a suit against the United States and others for the loss of a
Dassault Falcon 20-D jet aircraft. In this case, the Federal Ex-
press pilots had asked for and received night taxi clearance to
the active runway, Runway 23L. Because of their unfamiliar-
ity with the field, however, they taxied to the end of the paral-
lel runway, 23R. Although 23R was closed, the runway lights
were on because four aircraft which were temporarily parked
on that runway were being serviced. When the pilots radioed
that they were ready for departure, they received takeoff
clearance and subsequently crashed into the other aircraft
and service vehicles on the runway.19
"' 546 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
"4 See supra note 139.
"4 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) excludes "[alny claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights .... "Id.
"4 546 F. Supp. at 79.
" 644 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1981).
Iu The plaintiff's allegation that the controller negligently failed to ascertain the
19831
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The court held that the controller that gave the takeoff
clearance was not negligent for failing to observe the aircraft
visually to verify its location on the field prior to issuing the
clearance. 1" Moreover, the court stated that the controller
had a right to assume that, having given the aircraft clearance
to taxi to the proper runway, the aircraft should have been on
the proper runway. Furthermore, the court determined that
the controller did not violate any FAA procedure, because he
had determined the position of the aircraft on the field by us-
ing a "pilot report."'00 In other words, the court reasoned that
because the crew radioed that they were ready for departure
and had requested taxi clearance to the proper runway only a
few minutes previously, the crew had represented to the con-
troller that the aircraft was on the proper runway.
In Swoboda v. United States201 the plaintiff alleged that the
FAA proximately caused the death of her husband, Gerald
Swoboda, by negligently failing to institute proper rescue pro-
cedures after the decedent's plane crashed off the coast of
Alaska. The decedent, while ferrying an aircraft from Midway
Island to Adak, Alaska experienced radio difficulty. He was
forced to communicate with the other two planes accompany-
ing him by using a hand-held emergency locator transmitter
(ELT).'0 ' One of the companion planes notified FAA officials
Falcon's position was based upon two provisions of the FAA Air Traffic Control Man-
ual. Section 260 instructs controllers to "provide airport traffic control service based
only upon observed or known traffic and airport conditions." Section 386 directs
controllers to "determine the position of an aircraft prior to issuing taxi information
or takeoff clearance when its position is in doubt or unknown to you." Id. at 835.
" 664 F.2d at 837.
Id. at 836. The court stated that it refused to hold that:
"where the pilot has a map of the airport, where the controller has
correctly ascertained the aircraft's position prior to taxiing, where the
controller provides the aircraft with correct taxiing instructions, where
the pilot has announced he is proceeding to a specified runway, where
the controller has no reason to believe anything has gone awry, and
where the pilot subsequently announces that he is 'ready', it is not
clearly erroneous for the district court, acting as factfinder, to hold...
that the controller is not negligent."
Id. at 837.
662 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
101 All aircraft are required by 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976) to be equipped with an
ELT. After an accident, the ELT emits a continuous audio tone which allows the
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at Anchorage Center that a military aircraft had heard an
ELT signal from Swoboda's aircraft but told the officials that
the signals were Swoboda's way of telling them that he was
okay.
Although FAA officials violated the express language of an
FAA regulation20 8 by failing to notify the rescue coordination
center of Swoboda's ELT signal, the Fourth Circuit held that
under the circumstances the violation was excusable. 20' The
court reasoned that because the FAA officials knew that Swo-
boda's radio was not working and because one of the compan-
ion planes had made two position reports on Swoboda, it was
reasonable for FAA officials to rely upon the companion
plane's message that Swoboda's ELT transmission did not sig-
nify distress, but was instead a means of communicating.05
The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that FAA
officials were negligent both in failing to notify the Search and
Rescue Coordinator when Swoboda's plane was overdue at
Adak and in supplying the rescue control coodinator with in-
correct location information when the search finally began.
The court found that the failure to promptly notify the
Search and Rescue Coordinator was not negligent because the
FAA officials had no concrete reason to believe that Swoboda
was in distress and because a pilot of one of the companion
planes had told the officials that Swoboda had probably gone
to an alternate destination.2 " The court further held that the
inaccuracies in the location information were not the result of
a lack of due care on the part of the FAA because Anchorage
Center had received the incorrect position report from one of
the companion planes and merely had relayed it to the rescue
coordination center. 0 7
location of the aircraft to be determined.
2" An order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) states in part
that "[w]hen an ELT signal is received or reported, it shall be assumed that an emer-
gency exists. FAA facilities shall immediately notify the appropriate rescue coordina-
tion center ...." FAA, ORDER No. 6050.29 (Nov. 19, 1973).
:04 662 F.2d at 329.
Id. at 329-30.
:06 Id. at 330.
07 Id.
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Another decision absolving the government from liability
was Hahn v. United States.2 0 8 In Hahn, the plaintiff brought
suit in his capacity as the representative of the estate of a
passenger who died in a private plane that struck an electrical
cable on a power transmission line. The plaintiff alleged that
the government negligently failed to accurately and ade-
quately depict the transmission line and its altitude on the
aeronautical charts and that the government negligently failed
to place warning lights on the transmission towers. The court
found that the transmission line was accurately reflected on
the pertinent aeronautical charts. It further found that be-
cause the line was substantially under the level at which it
would have been considered an obstruction to air traffic under
FAA standards,209 the government was not negligent in failing
to indicate the height of the towers on the aeronautical
charts.21 0 The court concluded that the government had no
duty to light the power line because there was no indication
that the government had reason to believe the transmission
line posed any particular hazard to air traffic in the vicinity.
Further, it concluded that the evidence indicated that a pilot
taking off from the airport had adequate time to execute a
standard flight pattern before reaching the transmission line
which was five miles away.2 11
In Cooper v. Perkiomen Airways, Ltd.,212 the court dis-
missed a suit in which the plaintiff named the FAA as a de-
fendant but failed to file the appropriate administrative claim.
The court reiterated the first law of federal tort claims:
Conditions imposed by the FTCA as a prerequisite to suit in-
clude the requirement that would-be plaintiffs file, within the
specified time limit, and with the appropriate federal agency,
an administrative claim stating the amount of money to which
the aggrieved party believes they are entitled. Failure to do so
raises a jurisdictional defect; it cannot be waived and bars the
'" 535 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.D. 1982).
See 14 C.F.R. 77.13(a)(1) (1982).
535 F. Supp. at 136.
Id. at 136-37.
526 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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suit.213
On the other hand, the court in Forest v. United States 1'
excused the plaintiff's administrative error and refused to dis-
miss her wrongful death action against the government. In
Forest, the legal representative of the persons that possessed
the administrative claim 215 failed to comply with administra-
tive requirements that required the representative to make a
timely presentation of evidence of his authority to make the
claim. Ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court found that
extenuating circumstances 2 6 existed that excused literal com-
pliance with the requirements and that there was no showing
that the government was prejudiced.
VI. JURISDICTION
On a certified question from a diversity action in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana, the Su-
preme Court of Montana, in Reed v. American Airlines,
Inc.,217 held that the federal district court had in personam
jurisdiction over American Airlines (American) for damages
resulting from the loss of camera equipment. The plaintiff, a
Montana citizen, had traveled to New York City from Mis-
soula, Montana on Northwest Airlines and intended to trans-
fer flights and continue to Nepal on British Airways. The
plaintiff alleged that during the transfer process, American
113 Id. at 1086-87.
Il 539 F. Supp. 171 (D. Mont. 1982).
2-8 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e) (1982) states:
[a] claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall be
presented in the name of the claimant, be signed by the agent or the
legal representative, show the title or legal capacity of the person sign-
ing, and be accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a
claim on behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, par-
ent, guardian, or other representative.
Id.
21e 539 F. Supp. at 174-75. The court stated that "[t]he fact that the administrative
claim requirement is jurisdictional in nature, should not preclude consideration by
this court of equitable factors." Id. at 174. The court considered it important that the
rights of minors were involved and that prior to trial, the FAA required evidence
from the attorney of his authority to act on behalf of one claimant but did not re-
quest evidence of his authority to act on behalf of the other claimants. Id. at 174-75.
,11 640 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1982).
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came into possession of his camera equipment and was re-
sponsible for its loss.
American had no property or personnel located in Montana,
paid no taxes there, and, except for an infrequent charter
flight, did not fly into or out of Montana. On the other hand,
American solicited business in Montana by listings in
nineteen Montana phone directories, by television ads broad-
cast in Montana, and by furnishing material to travel agents
in Montana. Additionally, American personnel occasionaly go
to Montana to instruct Montana travel agents. American pro-
vided toll free calls to Montana residents to schedule flights
on American. The business generated from these calls was al-
most one million dollars per year.218
The defendants did not contend that "due process" would
be offended by the assertion of jurisdiction.2' 9 Instead, they
argued that Montana's Rule of Civil Procedure 4B(1) did not
permit the court to assert jurisdiction over the parties. Rule
4B(1) states: "All persons found within the state of Montana
are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. 2M
The court stated that "[b]efore the activities of a foreign cor-
poration can create a physical presence within Montana, those
activities must be substantial, continuous, and systematic as
opposed to isolated, casual or incidental."2"1 It held, that
American's activities satisfied2 22 the test and, thus, that Amer-
ican was "found in Montana" within the meaning of the
rule.2 28
In Missouri ex rel Newport v. Wiesman,22" the Supreme
Court of Missouri found that Beech Aircraft Corporation
(Beech), a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of
business in Kansas, was subject to personal jurisdiction in
sa Id. at 912-14.
"I Id. at 915.
:so MONT. R. Civ. P. 4B (1981).
*"3 640 P.2d at 914.
2 The court cited Ladd v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 456 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) and Gullet v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 417 F. Supp. 490 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), both
of which had facts very similar to the ones before the court.
:2 640 P.2d at 915.
2- 627 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1982).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Missouri. The action arose out of a crash in Georgia and was
grounded on strict liability for the manufacture of a defective
aircraft. The court found that the long arm statute 22  under
which personal service was effected on the defendants ex-
tended the personal jurisdiction of Missouri courts over non-
residents to the limits of "due process. '222  The court further
determined that Beech had "transact[ed] ... business within
[the] state" within the meaning of the statute because it had
established two franchised dealers in Missouri for the purpose
of sale and service of aircraft.2
2 7
With respect to federal due process, the court held that
Beech's business in Missouri alone constituted the "minimum
contacts" necessary to permit Missouri courts to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction. The court pointed out that Beech had
many business contacts with Missouri and had delivered its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that Missouri consumers would purchase them.2 2 The court
further found that the plaintiff was a Missouri resident.2
The Texas Supreme court reached a similar conclusion in
Hall v. Helicol.230 Hall arose out of a helicopter crash in Peru
in which the plaintiff's husband was killed. The helicopter was
owned and operated by Helicol, a corporation that had con-
tracted in Texas with the decedent's employer to supply heli-
copter services. Helicol did not maintain an office in Texas,
was not authorized to do business in Texas, and did not re-
cruit employees in Texas. On the other hand, Helicol pur-
chased substantially all of its helicopter fleet in Texas and
had employees in Texas.
With respect to the Texas long-arm statute, the Texas Su-
preme Court reaffirmed a prior case holding that the Texas
long arm statute" ' reaches as far as due process permits. 32
,, Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (1978).
,, 627 S.W.2d at 876.
"7 Id. at 877.
21 Id. at 879. The court's position was not changed by the fact that the aircraft at
issue was not one of the four models sold by Beech in Missouri. Id.
$29 Id.
230 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983).
2' Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1982).
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The court further found that Helicol's contacts constituted
"doing business" within the meaning of the long arm statute
and were sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due pro-
cess.'88 The court stated that it was not necessary that the
cause of action arise out of the contacts with the forum when
the defendant's contacts with the forum state are numer-
ous. 8 Other important factors that influenced the court's
finding that jurisdiction was proper were Texas' interest288 in
protecting the employees of its residents and the plaintiff's in-
terest in a convenient forum.
VII. CHOICE OF LAW
Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.,236 was a wrongful
death action which was brought in a Michigan federal court
by the estate of a New Zealand citizen who was killed in a
helicopter crash in New Zealand. 81 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant helicopter manufac-
turer, following the Michigan lex loci delicti rule,28 and the
court of appeals affirmed.8 9 Consequently, the substantive
law of New Zealand governed the case. The application of
New Zealand law resulted in a judgment for the defendant,
because New Zealand law did not permit persons covered by
New Zealand's comprehensive no-fault compensation act to
maintain common law personal injury or death actions."0 The
appellate court refused to bend the Michigan lex loci delicti
rule stating that even if a "dominant contacts" conflict of laws
rule were applied, it was doubtful that a Michigan court
"' U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
23 638 S.W.2d at 872.
I" Id. at 873.
2 Id. The court found that Texas had some interest in the litigation in spite of
the fact that the plaintiff was not a Texas resident.
2" 679 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1982).
22 Id. at 631.
3U Id. Lex loci delicti provides that the forum court should apply the substantive
law of the place of the wrong. Id. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262
N.W.2d 625 (1978).
1,9 679 F.2d at 632.
24 Id. at 631. See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First
Two Years, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1977).
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would apply Michigan substantive law, because there were no
such "dominant contacts.' 4 1
California has dropped the law of the place of the wrong' 4'
rule24 3 and follows the more flexible governmental interest
analysis 244 to determine which law to apply.245 Consequently,
in Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,24 a case arising out
of the mid-air collision of two aircraft in Yugoslavia, the court
applied California law on issues of strict liability and wrongful
death damages, and applied Yugoslavia law on the issue of
proportionate liability.247 In reaching this dichotomy, the
court pointed out that in Yugoslavia a defendant is required
to pay only that portion of damages for which he is held re-
sponsible; whereas, California law would have imposed the en-
tire liability on the defendant McDonnell Douglas, rather
than apportioning a share of the liability against Yugoslavian
tortfeasors.24' The court reasoned that applying Yogoslavia's
law, would impair Yugoslavia's interest in deterring the tor-
tious conduct of its residents within its borders. 49 The court,
therefore, concluded that because California had no interest
in applying its recovery rule to impose disproportionate liabil-
ity upon its resident defendant when all tortfeasors were not
subject to its jurisdiction, and because Yugoslavia's interest in
"1 679 F.2d at 632. The lower court had found that "[tihe mere fact that defen-
dant's helicopter was manufactured in Michigan is an insufficient reason to invoke
this state's public policy." Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[n]either the
decedent nor his family resided in Michigan. The downed helicopter was not owned
by a Michigan resident or corporation. Although the bailment of the helicopter to Mr.
Bennett was, as the district court noted, in a commercial environment, there was no
sale and no employment contract [between defendant Enstrom and the decedent]."
Id.
4' See supra note 239.
*" See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
'44 The governmental interest analysis approach to conflict of laws is that the fo-
rum should apply the substantive law of the state which has the most important in-
terest in the application of its policy. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
' See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314
(1972).
"I 504 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
24 Id. at 519.
" Id. at 518-19.
* Id. at 519.
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deterring wrongful conduct within its borders would be im-
paired if its law were not applied, there was a compelling rea-
son to displace forum law on that issue.2 50 The court contin-
ued by stating that even if the result were to limit damages
recoverable by plaintiffs, it "would be justified because Cali-
fornia had no interest in impairing the ability of California
corporations to compete in other jurisdictions by imposing
upon them obligations to foreign residents which exceed those
imposed by the foreign jurisdictions."' 1
In Cox v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,'' the survivors of a
United States Air Force captain who was killed in a 1970
Idaho air crash brought a wrongful death action in a Texas
federal court.253 The district court applied the law of Mis-
souri, which was the state where the defendant had its princi-
pal place of business and where the accident aircraft had been
designed and built.'' Missouri's statute of limitation barred
the plaintiffs' action . 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that Idaho law (the law of the place of the
injury) applied and that the action of the decedent's minor
children was not barred by the Idaho statute of limitations.""
The court remanded to the district court the issue of whether
the widow's claim was barred. It instructed the lower court to
determine whether the "discovery rule" and "fradulent con-
cealment" doctrine, applied vel non because the widow
claimed that the Air Force had misled her regarding the na-
ture of her husband's fatal accident.2 7
The court in Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Lockheed
Corp."" held that the law of Georgia, the place where the
plaintiff's allegedly defective airplane was manufactured, was
more appropriate for determining tort liability for negligence
2" Id.
"' Id.
"5 665 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1982).
183 Id. at 567.
204 Id.
" Id.
1" Id. at 573.
Id.
'" 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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than the law of Wisconsin, the place where the alleged defects
were discovered.2" The court reasoned that the discovery of
the defects in Wisconsin was fortuitous and that the place of
the alleged misconduct (the negligent manufacture of the air-
plane) had a greater interest in applying its laws.2 0 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff was denied recovery because under Georgia
law a corporate plaintiff cannot recover upon a strict liability
theory. Moreover, a plaintiff may not recover ecomonic losses
under a negligence theory.2 1
VIII. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno," 2 the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed the issue of forum non conveniens.
Reyno was a wrongful death action brought by an American
representative of foreign residents20 3 against Piper2" and
Hartzell2" as a result of a crash that occurred in Scotland.2"
Both defendants moved to dismiss the action on the basis of
forum non conveniens and the district court granted the mo-
tions, reasoning that Scotland was the more appropriate fo-
rum. In reaching this decision, the court first balanced the
private interest factors" 7 affecting the convenience of the par-
,59 Id. at 1208.
"0 Id. at 1208-09.
281 Id. at 1209-10.
-2 102 S. Ct. 252 (1982).
"1" Id. at 257. The decedents, the pilot and five passengers, were all Scottish citi-
zens and residents, as were their heirs and next of kin. Id.
'04 Piper Aircraft company manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania. Id.
Id. at 258.
2" Id. at 257.
"7 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (M.D. Pa. 1979). The
court stated:
The real parties in interest are citizens of Scotland as were all the
decedents. Witnesses who could testify regarding the maintenance of
the aircraft, the training of the pilot, and the investigation of the acci-
dent - all essential to the defense - are in Great Britain. Moreover, all
witnesses to damages are located in Scotland. Trial would be aided by
familiarity with Scottish topography, and by easy access to the
wreckage.
The district court applied the balancing test of private and public interests set forth
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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ties and the public interest factorssee affecting the convenience
to the forum. It refused to accord any weight to plaintiff's ar-
gument that dismissal would result in the application of the
less favorable law of Scotland.""9 The Third Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that its forum non conveniens anal-
ysis was incorrect and that dismissal is never appropriate
when the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff.170
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit
Court, holding that a dismissal for forum non conveniens
should not be denied upon the mere showing that the sub-
stantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is
less favorable than the law of the chosen forum. It further
held that the possibility that the substantive law would
change ordinarily should not be given conclusive, or even sub-
stantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.'71 The
Court also held that the district court's private and public in-
terest analysis was reasonable.'T' The Court concluded that
the public interest favored trial in Scotland, since the accident
occurred there, all the decedents were Scottish and, except for
the manufacturers, all potential plaintiffs and defendants
were either Scottish or English.7 3
The private and public interest factors were again weighed
in Lampitt v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,7 4 which was an action
that arose from the crash of a Beech Super King Air 200 in
m The district court noted that an alternate forum existed in Scotland, that Piper
and Hartzell had agreed to submit to Scottish jurisdiction, and that the plaintiff's
choice of forum was not entitled to "substantial deference" when plaintiffs were for-
eign citizens who sought "[tlo benefit from the more liberal tort provided for the
protection of citizens and residents of the United States." 102 S. Ct. at 252 (1981).
s"Id.
270 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1980).
"1 102 S. Ct. at 261. The Court stated that it had expressly rejected the Third
Circuit's position in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamship Co., 285 U.S. 413
(1932). Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that "[i]f central emphasis were placed on
any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the flexibility
that makes it so valuable." Id. at 262.
r" Id. at 266-68.
278 Id.
274 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,358 (N.D. I1. 1982).
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France on a flight from England. 70 Plaintiffs, heirs of the de-
ceased pilot, brought this wrongful death action against Beech
on theories of negligence, breach of warranty and strict liabil-
ity. The decedent, a British citizen, was the pilot for a British
aviation company.' 76 The court found that the private interest
factors, especially the presence of the witnesses and evidence
in Great Britain,2" weighed in favor of dismissal.'7  It also
found that the public interest factors favored dismissal be-
cause Illinois had no interest in the outcome of the litigation,
and its connection with the defendant Beech was tenuous, at
best. 9
In In Re Disaster At Riyadh Airport Saudi Arabia,s2" mul-
tidistrict litigation against Saudi Arabian Airlines, Trans
World Airlines, Inc. and Lockheed Corporation grew out of
the tragedy at Riyadh in Saudi Arabia during the summer of
1980. The defendants' motions based on forum non con-
veniens were conditionally granted. At the time the motion
was argued, all cases of United States residents had been set-
tled, and the remaining plaintiffs were foreign.2 81 The court
determined that the alternative forums that were available
were adequate, 82 and that the private 283 and public 284 inter-
271 Id. The aircraft was manufactured by Beech Aircraft Corp., a Delaware corpora-
tion, whose principal place of business was in Kansas. It was operated by Eagle Air-
craft Services, a British company. Id.
210 Id.
27 Id. at 17,360.
276 Id.
271 Id. The court also noted that under Illinois choice of law principles, English law
would be applied in any event. Id.
2" 540 F. Supp. 1141 (D. D.C. 1982).
"I Id. at 1144.
2S2 Id. at 1146. The court found that the likelihood of lesser damage awards and
the unavailability of a contingent fee relationship in an alternative forum do not
make those forums inadequate. An alternative forum is inadequate only where the
available remedy is "'clearly unsatisfactory.'" Id. at 1145-46 (quoting Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 102 S. Ct. 252, 265 n.22 (1982)).
I" Id. at 1146-51. The court found the private interest factors to outweigh only
slightly the presumption against disturbing plaintiff's initial forum choice. Id. at
1151.
2" Id. at 1151-54. The court found the public interest factors (contacts between the
forum and the litigation, interest of the forum in the litigation, and familiarity with
governing law) clearly favored the use of a foreign forum. Id.
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est factors favored the use of a foreign forum,'8 especially
since all plaintiffs were foreign. 86 The court dismissed the
suit on the condition that the defendants agree to appear and
defend damage suits in foreign forums, to waive limitations on
compensatory damages imposed by the Warsaw Convention,
guarantee jointly and severally payment of judgments, and to
not raise the statute of limitations defense.
87
IX. OPERATION OF AIRPORTS
Aircraft noise, nuisance and inverse condemnation cases
still abound, but only a few are worthy of mention. In North-
east Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Municipal
Airport,288 a group of citizens sought an injunction to restrain
the extension of a runway, to impose a reasonable curfew on
flight operations, and to prohibit right hand turns on takeoff.
They further sought to require all aircraft to use the full run-
way and the available threshold in their operations, which
would cause aircraft to over-fly the plaintiffs' property only
when necessary and at the highest altitude possible.'8e
The plaintiffs in Northeast Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n
sought injunctive relief for trespass, nuisance and alleged vio-
lations of federal regulations and state statutes.' e° As to the
state statutes, the court, applying a preemption analysis held
that it could not "formulate injunctive relief based on state
statutes regulating flight operations because the federal regu-
latory scheme precludes additional regulations of flight.' 129
The Arizona Court of Appeals applied the "proprietors' ex-
ception" to federal preemption of aviation regulations which
the United States Supreme Court recognized in Burbank v.
m Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1144.
n Id. at 1155.
- 130 Ariz. 487, 636 P.2d 1269 (1981). Multiple party litigation arose out of a
conflict between residents in Northeast Phoenix whose homes were located under the
flight path of airplanes using the Scottsdale Municipal Airport and the City of Scotts-
dale as the owner and operator of the airport. 636 P.2d at 1270.
Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1278. The plaintiffs specifically alleged violations of federal regulations
pertaining to flight operations, 14 C.F.R. § 911 (1982). 636 P.2d at 1278.
'1 636.P.2d at 1279.
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Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.'92 The court, denying injunctive
relief, stated that that exception does not allow courts exercis-
ing injunctive powers to force proprietors to act with regard to
airport operations. In other words, the Arizona court main-
tained that the Burbank preemption rule applied not only to
state and local legislation, but also to judicial rules and regu-
lations governing airport and airline operations.2 93
Regarding the violations of federal aviation regulations, the
Arizona court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek
direct judicial enforcement of these regulations.'94 The court
construed the Federal Aviation Act to preclude "direct injunc-
tive enforcement of any other FAA regulation by a private
party in interest. 2 93 The court noted, however, that the plain-
tiffs had an administrative remedy29" and could file a com-
plaint with the DOT, which must investigate and is empow-
ered to issue orders compelling compliance.29
In Drybread v. City of Saint Louis,"98 the plaintiffs sought
damages and injunctive relief to abate an "existing nuisance"
at the St. Louis Airport.29 Drybread, like Northeast Phoenix
"2 411 U.S. 624 (1973). The owner and operator of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
brought suit against the City of Burbank seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing an
ordinance which would prohibit any pure jet aircraft from taking off from the airport
between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. Id. The District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia enjoined enforcement of the ordinance, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970), and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Justice Douglas, expressing the views of five members of the
Court, stated that the Federal Aviation Administration in conjunction with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), has full control over aircraft noise, preempting
state and local control under the state police powers. 411 U.S. at 633-34.
n9 636 P.2d at 1276 (citing Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1975)).
2' 636 P.2d at 1279. The court, relying on the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub.
L. 85-726, Title X, § 1007, 72 Stat. 796 (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1976)),
stated that the article provides that only the Board or Administrator may apply to
the district courts of the United States for injunctive relief and that a "party in inter-
est" may apply for an injunction only in those cases involving violations of 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (relating to certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity). 636 P.2d at 1279.
28 636 P.2d at 1279.
'"Id.
Id. 14 U.S.C. § 1482 (1976 Supp. & 1981).
634 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App. 1982).
I ld. at 520.
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Homeowners' Ass'n, was an action by a group of homeowners
whose property was directly beneath flight paths designated
for jet aircraft. In looking at the conduct complained of and
the relief requested, the court reasoned that because the city
could not reasonably abate the nuisance by closing the air-
port,300 the plaintiffs' action, in reality, was an action for a
permanent nuisance and, therefore, should have been a con-
demnation proceeding.3 01
In Joseph v. Helmss a group of homeowners brought an
inverse condemnation suit against the United States Govern-
ment alleging that the operation of the Washington National
Airport resulted in a taking of their property. The claims were
dismissed because the plaintiffs were unable to refute docu-
mented government affidavits that stated that there had been
no significant change in published flight paths, in the number
of flights into and out of the airport, or in the type of aircraft
operated by air carriers at Washington National since the
plaintiffs acquired their property. 03 Because of these uncon-
troverted affidavits, the court did not consider whether a tak-
ing had occurred. It reasoned that even if a taking had oc-
curred, the plaintiffs would not qualify for compensation
because any arguable navigation easement in the airspace
above their land existed before they acquired the property.
The court further stated that if the flights were so low and so
frequent as to amount to a taking under the rule of United
"0 Id. at 521. The court stated that closing or relocating the airport would not be
"reasonably practicable." The court stated "[t]he [plaintiff'sJ relief, if any, for the
permanent nuisance lies in their inverse condemnation claim," citing United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 634 S.W.2d at 521.
aol 634 S.W.2d at 520-21.
'o, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,287 (D.D.C. 1981).
Ios ld. at 18,288. The court therein stated:
In the face of this uncontroverted submission, we cannot gainsay the
district court's ruling that appellants failed to show a genuine issue for
trial. See FED. R. Civ. PRc. 56(c). It did not suffice for appellant to
complain of existing condition or to assert generally that "[a]ircraft
operations typically build up slowly over years and decades." It was
incumbant upon them to set forth specific facts counteracting the Gov-
ernment's documented statements of "no significant change" from the
period prior to appellants' ownership.
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States v. Causby,30 " a reasonably diligent inspection and in-
quiry would have revealed the pervasive interference. Thus,
the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves
of the rule that the purchaser of land burdened by an ease-
ment takes it free and clear of such burden because the plain-
tiffs had either actual or constructive notice of the
easement. 08
DiPerri v. Federal Aviation Administrations " was a private
action intended to force the FAA to resolve airport noise
problems at a local airport. The plaintiffs in DiPerri alleged
that both the Massachusetts Port Authority and the FAA col-
laborated to create an unreasonable nuisance condition by op-
erating the Logan Airport. The complaint sought relief not
only from the severe noise pollution but also from an alleged
safety hazard. The complaint alleged that aircraft flew over a
large oil tank farm at a height of only three hundred feet.30
The court held that neither 49 U.S.C. § 1348, which gives the
Administrator authority over flight patterns, nor 49 U.S.C. §
1431, which gives him authority over aircraft noise, supported
the plaintiffs' action for relief.8"
X. DAMAGES, JUDGMENTS AND COSTS
In Bottazzi v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,8" the plaintiff
suffered a severe, long-term psychological reaction as a result
of the combined effect of two helicopter accidents. Plaintiff
brought separate actions against separate defendants, but Pe-
troleum Helicopters, Inc. was a common defendant in each
suit. The cases were consolidated for trial, and the plaintiff's
mental infirmities supplied the necessary "common question
304 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby, the respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken
farm near a municipal airport. The issue involved was whether respondents' property
was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular
flights at low altitudes. In order to constitute a taking, the Supreme Court in Causby,
stated that the flights over the property must render it uninhabitable to its owners.
Id. at 261.
800 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,288.
06 671 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1982).
07 Id. at 55.
3" Id. at 56-59.
3- 664 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981).
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of law or fact" that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) re-
quires for consolidation. 10 At the trial, experts testified that
"it was impossible to assign to either [accident] a proportion-
ate degree of causation [of the plaintiff's injury]." 11 In ap-
proving an equal division of damages between the defendants,
the court held that "[r]eason suggests that where .. .sepa-
rate wrongful acts by different tortfeasors produce a unitary
injury and where the degree of contribution of each act to that
injury cannot be ascertained, an equal division of damages re-
sulting from it is appropriate". 12 The court stated that "any
other rule would deny the injured party [a] recovery. . . be-
cause he was unable to prove how much each one caused. '3 1 8
The court stated that the equal apportionment rule was a rule
of necessity and described it as "a lesser evil than exonerating
one or more culpable parties because the discrete degrees by
which they contributed to the injury are either unproved or
unprovable."' 14
In suits arising out of the American Airlines DC-10 accident
at Chicago's O'Hare Airport in 1979, the defendants in In Re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois' sought to intro-
duce evidence of what portion of the decedents' past earnings
were subject to taxation and of the percentage of future earn-
ings that would have been subject to taxes.1' The defendants
also requested a jury instruction that any jury award would be
exempt from taxation and that the "jury should not be con-
cerned about or consider the effect of taxes on the award.' 1 17
These issues were the subject of motions in limine by both
plaintiff and defendant.' 1' The court finding against the de-
fendants stated that federal law, if free from the diversity ju-
risdiction obligations imposed by Erie,'19 would admit the
o10 Id. at 50-51.




"1 526 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. IH. 1981).
3" Id. at 227.
$17 Id.
s Id. at 228.
"' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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taxation evidence and allow the requested instructions. It
stated, however, that because Illinois law was contrary, it
must apply, reasoning that it would be unfair for the charac-
ter or result of the litigation to differ materially because the
suit was in federal, rather than, state court.32 0
On the issue of the liability for damage awards among joint
tortfeasors, the plaintiff in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Dumon 3 2
paid more than its pro rata share of a personal injury judg-
ment for which plaintiff and defendants were jointly and sev-
erally liable. The plaintiff sought to recover the additional
sum that it had paid. The defendants contended that their
negligence that gave rise to the original suit was only passive,
whereas the plaintiff's was active. They, therefore, argued that
they should not have to contribute to the judgment. Ruling in
favor of the plaintiff, the court held that the time for a joint
tortfeasor to contest the extent of his liability vis-a-vis an-
other tortfeasor is at the trial of the original action. The court
stated that after a joint judgment is entered against a party,
he no longer can litigate the extent of his liability to other
defendants.2 2
The Ninth Circuit refused to allow the recovery of prejudg-
ment interest in Berns v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,s23 which was a wrongful death action. In Berns, the court
entered judgment in favor of surviving children of airplane
crash victims. The plaintiffs had requested an instruction au-
thorizing the jurors to award interest on the childrens' recov-
ery from the date of their parents' death.32 ' The court held
that "their damages were not subject to precise calculation"
and, therefore, that prejudgment interest was not recover-
able.32 " Further, the court noted that the children "were not
deprived of the use of a readily ascertainable sum of money
during the period from the date of their. . . [parents'] death
820 526 F. Supp. 231 (quoting Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965)).
l111 Mich. App. 613, 314 N.W.2d 709 (1981).
122 314 N.W.2d at 711.
13 667 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982).
, Id. at 829.
"5 Id.
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to the date of judgment." '
On the other hand, recovery of prejudgment interest was al-
lowed in Safeco Insurance Co. v. City of Watertown,"' which
was a subrogation action for the total loss of an aircraft. The
interest award, however, did not commence until the date the
complaint was filed, which was the first date at which it ap-
peared that the damages had become certain.2 s Notably, in
this case, the court excepted from prejudgment interest those
times during which the action was ready for trial but trial had
been delayed upon the plaintiff's motion for a continuance. 29
Another case involving prejudgment interest is Havis v. Pe-
troleum Helicopters, Inc.83 0 In Havis, the plaintiff had a mari-
time cause of action for the crash of his helicopter at sea, but
he alleged both maritime and diversity jurisdiction in his com-
plaint and, further, demanded a jury trial." ' He did not re-
quest prejudgment interest at the trial, and the jury returned
a general verdict in his favor.332 On plaintiff's later motion,
the district court awarded prejudgment interest.333 Reversing
the award, the Fifth Circuit stated that when a maritime case
is tried solely to a jury under the exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion, the grant or denial of prejudgment interest must be sub-
mitted to the jury.8"
Concerning the issue of costs and expenses in multi-district
litigation cases, the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals in In Re
Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam" ' held that
it was reasonable and within the ambit of the district court's
discretion to allocate litigation costs on a per capita basis
without regard to the size of any particular plaintiff's settle-
I /d.
'538 F. Supp. 49 (D.S.D. 1982).
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 52.




Id. (citing Robinson v. Poca Hontas, Inc. 477 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (1st Cir.
1973)).
671 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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ment. 33 The court held, however, that costs could not be as-
sessed against a plaintiff's counsel, as the court below had
done, because costs are sanctioned against counsel personally
only in specific cases of bad faith action by the attorney. In
this case no instances of bad faith were present. 83 7
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Federal Aviation Act
Private causes of action were addressed by a New York Dis-
trict Court in Halama v. New Horizons Helicopter Corp.,338 in
which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a private corporation
from spraying pesticides from a helicopter and alleged viola-
tions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. The court held that the Act gives no
private right of action to sue for its violations.
Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Board3 9 was an action by
two passengers who were denied the privilege of smoking on
an Eastern Airlines flight. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that there was no implied right of action against an air
carrier to require it to comply with its own rules on smoking
and that denying a passenger the right to smoke did not con-
stitute discrimination within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. §
1374(b). 40 The plaintiffs' breach of contract and tort claims
against Eastern were dismissed on Eastern's motion for lack
of the requisite diversity jurisdiction amount, even though the
plaintiffs were claiming $50,000 in damages.341 On this issue,
the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show some
basis for the amount of damages they claimed and stated that
this aspect of the suit was precisely the kind of petty contro-
versy that Congress intended the jurisdictional amount to ex-
Id. at 566.
37 Id. at 567-68.
3" 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,339 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
'" 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982).
340 Id. at 1043-46.
"I Id. at 1051-53.
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clude from federal jurisdiction.3 4 2
B. Tariffs
It is well established that valid tariffs filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board govern the rights and liabilities between
airlines and their domestic passengers.3 '3 For example in
Chambers & Assoc. v. Trans World Airlines3 4 4 the court held
that the tariff limiting the liability of an airline to $750.00 for
loss of baggage continues in effect after the passenger's trip
has ended and the airline has delivered, delayed or misplaced
baggage to a private delivery service. The court held that the
tariff applied although the passenger's baggage subsequently
had been stolen. Having found the tariff in effect, the court
also dismissed for lack of the requisite jurisdictional amount
in a diversity action.345
C. Deregulation
In Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Civil Aeronautics Board346
the court held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did
not impose upon the CAB a requirement that the CAB con-
sider whether each applicant for operating authority will be as
safe as the industry-wide average. Additionally, the court held
that the Act does not require independent technical assess-
ments of safety by the CAB, nor does it establish a more
stringent safety standard for new carrier applicants during the
transition period before the CAB is abolished in 1984. The
court therein noted that air carrier economic regulation re-
mains within the province of the CAB, while safety regulation
of civil aeronautics is entrusted to the FAA.
"' Id. at 1053.
*4' See North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229,
233 (2d Cir. 1978) where the court held, "[Ilt is clear that a carrier's valid federal
tariffs which are applicable to shipment at issue govern not only the nature and ex-
tent of liability, but also the nature and extent of the shipper's right of recovery."Id.
U, 533 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
I d. at 429.
u 667 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Sievers v. Beechcraft Manufacturing Co.,'" the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, ap-
plying Louisiana law, refused to apply the "res ipsa loquitur"
doctrine in a products liability action. The court held that the
doctrine did not apply when it could not be shown that the
aircraft was in the exclusive control of the manufacturer or
that the cause of the accident was more properly within the
knowledge of the manufacturer, and when pilot error was a
plausible alternative explanation." 8 On the other hand, the
Fourth Circuit in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Riggs,"' apply-
ing Virginia law, refused to apply the doctrine in a negligence
action against a pilot, stating that "it is a matter of common
knowledge that an aircraft may fall or crash in the absence of
negligence or fault on the part of the pilot."O
E. Trivia
The court in Saintshannanday v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. 351 held that an air carrier had no duty to place a guard in
a lost baggage inquiry room to prevent the unlikely event that
a passenger who was irate over losing his baggage would vent
his anger by assaulting another passenger who had also lost
his luggage. The court reasoned that while, in retrospect, one
could argue that TWA should have foreseen the unfortunate
event, its occurrence was not objectively reasonable to expect.
"7 497 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1980).
34 Id. at 202-04.
11 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 815 (citing Surface v. Johnson, 215 Va. 777, 214 S.E.2d 152 (1975)).
051 16 Av. Cas. (OCH) 18,232 (N.D. IMi. 1982).
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